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ABSTRACT—During President Barack Obama’s Administration, significant 
light was shed on the depth of the United States’ campus sexual assault 
problem. As a result, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights 
increased enforcement of Title IX provisions by way of its 2011 “Dear 
Colleague Letter.” This Note argues that the Dear Colleague Letter was 
improperly enforced as if it were a formal legislative rule and was therefore 
illegitimate. Nevertheless, this Note contends that the preponderance of the 
evidence standard initially enshrined within the Dear Colleague Letter 
should be adopted through the notice-and-comment procedures President 
Donald Trump’s Administration promises in order to protect the interests 
of campus sexual assault survivors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an age when the seriousness of the United States’ campus sexual 
assault problem has gained national prominence,1 but public sexual assault 
accusations against celebrities and the President of the United States are 
frequently ignored,2 the federal government’s efforts to reform public 
schools’ approach to these matters has never been more critical. In April 
2011, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued a “Dear Colleague Letter” 
(DCL) as a “significant guidance document” to aid schools in navigating 
 
 1 See, e.g., Irin Carmon, What Advocates Are Doing to End Sexual Assault on Campus, NBC NEWS 
(Sept. 4, 2016, 5:20 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/what-advocates-are-doing-end-
sexual-assault-campus-n642156 [https://perma.cc/NT27-NPF]; Niraj Chokshi, University of Wisconsin 
Student Arrested in Multiplying Sexual Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/us/university-of-wisconsin-student-arrested-in-multiplying-
sexual-assault-cases.html [https://perma.cc/QDH6-3NZF]; Manohla Dargis, Review: “The Hunting 
Ground” Documentary, a Searing Look at Campus Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/movies/review-the-hunting-ground-documentary-a-searing-look-
at-campus-rape.html [https://perma.cc/K7BA-GPLE]; Christine Hauser, Judge’s Sentencing in 
Massachusetts Sexual Assault Case Reignites Debate on Privilege, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/us/david-becker-massachusetts-sexual-assault.html 
[https://perma.cc/69FR-GF47]. 
 2 See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Trump, Cosby, Ailes: It Took Celebrity Accusers to Make Us Listen to 
Sexual Assault Victims, VOX (Oct. 18, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://www.vox.com/identities/2016/10/18/
13306300/trump-cosby-ailes-sexual-harrasment [https://perma.cc/BZC6-AU5P]; Leslie Savan, The 
Rape Allegations Against Trump: If Jane Doe Breaks Her Silence, Will the Media Break Theirs?, 
NATION (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-trump-allegations-as-jane-doe-breaks-
her-silence-will-the-media [https://perma.cc/AE22-TFRA]; Bill Wyman, The Press Is Responsible for 
Ignoring Bill Cosby Rape Allegations: Where Were Journalists 10 Years Ago When Claims Originally 
Surfaced Against Him?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.cjr.org/
behind_the_news/bill_cosby_downfall.php [https://perma.cc/H8WW-YJZU]. 
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their Title IX duties3 to “take immediate and effective steps to end sexual 
harassment and sexual violence” on campuses.4 The DCL included an array 
of previously undisclosed directives that inform schools of the standards 
they will be held to if OCR ever evaluates them for Title IX violations. 
These directives cover how schools are expected to investigate sexual 
assault investigations,5 how the adjudications should proceed,6 and what 
standard of proof should be used in those proceedings.7 However, OCR 
disseminated the DCL to schools without undergoing notice-and-comment 
rulemaking—the process normally required if agencies wish to legally 
enforce the provisions within a given document.8 Although the DCL did 
not undergo the notice-and-comment process, over the past several years, 
OCR has concluded investigations of schools with resolution agreements 
requiring the institution to alter aspects of their campus adjudicatory 
processes to align with provisions in the DCL.9 This enforcement scheme 
has raised concerns among jurists, legal scholars, activists, and the broader 
legal community about whether OCR abused its power by misusing 
exceptions to the rulemaking processes.10 
Additionally, some educators and lawyers disagree with the letter’s 
requirement that schools utilize a preponderance of the evidence standard 
 
 3 Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in “any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). The statute has been interpreted to require schools to 
take active measures to ensure that women receive equal educational opportunities, including a learning 
environment free from sexual harassment. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS, TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE (2015). These requirements attach to nearly every public and 
private educational institution because even the large majority of undergraduate and graduate schools 
receive federal monetary support in the form of financial aid. See Ibby Caputo & Jon Marcus, The 
Controversial Reason Some Religious Colleges Forgo Federal Funding: The Schools Avoid Reporting 
Requirements, but Students Can’t Get Grants or Loans, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/07/the-controversial-reason-some-religious-
colleges-forgo-federal-funding/490253 [https://perma.cc/52DK-KN4W] (discussing and listing the 
limited number of religious institutions that have chosen not to accept federal funds, in large part to 
avoid Title IX). 
 4 RUSSLYNN ALI, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1 n.1, 2 (2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3S9-VJ5H] [hereinafter 2011 DCL]. 
 5 See, e.g., id. at 10 (“Although a school may need to delay temporarily the fact-finding portion of a 
Title IX investigation while the police are gathering evidence . . . [afterward,] the school must promptly 
resume and complete its fact-finding for the Title IX investigation.”). 
 6 See, e.g., id. at 12 (“OCR strongly discourages schools from allowing the parties personally to 
question or cross-examine each other during the hearing.”). 
 7 See id. at 11 (“[I]n order for a school’s grievance procedures to be consistent with Title IX 
standards, the school must use a preponderance of the evidence standard . . . .”). 
 8 See infra Section II.A. 
 9 See infra Section III.A. 
 10 See infra Part III. 
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in all campus sexual assault adjudications.11 This requires a showing that “it 
is more likely than not that sexual harassment or violence occurred.”12 
Some believe that this standard provides marginal protection for the 
accused and creates an unjust risk that a finding will be entered against 
them.13 The history of campus sexual assault proceedings says otherwise, 
however, and many schools applied the preponderance standard long 
before the DCL was published.14 Victims of sexual assault need the 
procedural protections provided by the preponderance standard, but it 
cannot be legally enforced unless it is a valid exercise of agency 
rulemaking. 
The DCL’s legitimacy has been an open question since its 
implementation15 and has taken center stage since the appointment of Betsy 
DeVos as the Secretary of the Department of Education in early 2017.16 
Petitioners have legally challenged the DCL, and some have directly 
 
 11 See, e.g., Harvard University Professors, Opinion, Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, 
BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-
sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html [https://perma.cc/A9ZJ-
3CUM]; Penn Law Professors, Open Letter from Members of the Penn Law School Faculty (Feb. 18, 
2015), http://media.philly.com/documents/OpenLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/52WU-E65V]. 
 12 2011 DCL, supra note 4, at 11. 
 13 See infra note 167; see also, e.g., Barclay Sutton Hendrix, Note, A Feather on One Side, a Brick 
on the Other: Tiling the Scale Against Males Accused of Sexual Assault in Campus Disciplinary 
Proceedings, 47 GA. L. REV. 591, 615 (2013) (“[S]tudents accused of sexual assault in campus 
disciplinary proceedings are due a clear and convincing burden of proof because their interests far 
outweigh any costs imposed on the university by this additional protection . . . .”); Peter Berkowitz, 
College Rape Accusations and the Presumption of Male Guilt, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903596904576516232905230642 
[https://perma.cc/W8WP-RDGS] (“[U]niversities are institutionalizing a presumption of guilt in sexual 
assault cases.”). 
 14 See Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 
125 YALE L. J. 1940, 1986–87, 1987 n.257 (2016) (citing HEATHER M. KARJANE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT: HOW AMERICA’S INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION RESPOND 
120 (2002), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/196676.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2BH-F7GT]) 
(stating that 80% of colleges that named a standard of proof in their school codes used a preponderance 
of the evidence standard). 
 15 See, e.g., Will Creeley, Why the Office for Civil Rights’ April “Dear Colleague Letter” Was 
2011’s Biggest FIRE Fight, FIRE (Jan. 3, 2012), https://www.thefire.org/why-the-office-for-civil-
rights-april-dear-colleague-letter-was-2011s-biggest-fire-fight/ [https://perma.cc/Z3W9-ZQDT]. See 
generally Jeannie Suk Gersen, College Students Go to Court Over Sexual Assault, NEW YORKER (Aug. 
5, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/colleges-go-to-court-over-sexual-assault 
[https://perma.cc/29D4-4LWZ]. 
 16 Although Secretary DeVos initially refused to declare a stance on campus sexual assault in her 
confirmation hearings, proponents of the Obama Administration’s campus sexual assault reform 
measures have always been concerned about what her views may be. See Molly Redden & Sabrina 
Siddiqui, Betsy Devos Hearing Prompts Fears for Campus Sexual Assault Protections, THE GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/17/betsy-devos-hearing-prompts-fears-
for-campus-sexual-assault-protections [https://perma.cc/6JNS-LSNH]. Despite this Administration’s 
reluctance to further the DCL, a later Administration could take up the issue. 
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challenged the enforcement of the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
The plaintiff in one such case, Doe v. Lhamon,17 argued that the DCL’s 
assertion that schools utilize a preponderance of the evidence standard in 
campus adjudications “ensures that victims, like Plaintiff John Doe” 
become “collateral damage” in the government’s battle to reform Title IX.18 
Though the suit is not yet resolved,19 and though the DCL’s fate may have 
recently been sealed by Secretary DeVos’s decision to denounce the DCL,20 
the dispute provides insight into the controversy surrounding the measures 
the DCL attempted to implement. The Doe case demonstrates the 
procedural deficiencies of the DCL and why documents of this kind can be 
so easily revoked—something that President Trump’s Administration has 
apparently taken note of.21 
This Note addresses both the need for sexual assault reform and the 
limits of OCR’s power within our country’s agency-based federal legal 
system. In a sense, this Note sides with anti-DCL advocates who believe 
the guidance was always invalid. But, while those advocates believe that 
the DCL’s procedural deficiencies go hand in hand with the perceived 
substantive shortcomings of the preponderance standard, this Note 
demonstrates that they should be considered separately and that the 
substantive preponderance requirement should be preserved. The only way 
to preserve the preponderance standard is to legitimize it fully through 
legislative rulemaking.22 OCR could then enforce the use of the 
preponderance standard to aid victims of sexual assault at educational 
institutions across the country. A legislative rule is the strongest weapon 
OCR can wield, and it could affirmatively aid the movement for campus 
sexual assault reform. 
Part I of this Note discusses the background of OCR’s Title IX 
enforcement and rule promulgation both before and after the DCL’s 
issuance. Part II then surveys the administrative law scheme to which OCR 
must adhere and discusses the difference between legislative rules and the 
 
 17  No. 1:16-cv-01158-RC (D.D.C. June 16, 2016). 
 18 Amended Complaint at 2, Doe, No. 1:16-cv-01158-RC (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2016). 
 19 A motion to hold in abeyance was jointly filed by the parties and agreed to by the court on 
August 11, 2017. Order at 1, Doe, No. 1:16-cv-01158-RC (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2017). 
 20 See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 21 See CANDICE JACKSON, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE 
LETTER (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3YWN-CD9Y] [hereinafter 2017 DCL] (announcing the withdrawal of the 2011 DCL, 
in part because the “Department imposed . . . regulatory burdens without affording notice and the 
opportunity for public comment”). 
 22 Legislative rulemaking is the process whereby an agency promulgates a rule that is 
independently enforceable against regulated entities. See infra Part II. 
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relevant nonlegislative rules that operate as exemptions. It also addresses 
methods that courts use to determine whether an agency document was 
properly promulgated under an exception. Next, Part III evaluates the Doe 
plaintiffs’ contentions that the DCL was an invalid legislative rule and 
ultimately concludes that the DCL was procedurally invalid because it was 
a legislative rule that was improperly promulgated. Lastly, Part IV 
discusses the challenges of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process 
that OCR must undergo to promulgate a legislative rule. It also argues, 
chiefly, that the preponderance standard should be adopted through notice-
and-comment rulemaking because it is necessary to create a campus 
adjudication process that effectuates the goals of Title IX. 
I.   SETTING THE SCENE: TITLE IX ENFORCEMENT 
Congress passed Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act23 in 
1972 as a response to the limited educational opportunities available to 
women.24 Under the Act, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”25 Thus, Title IX explicitly prohibits 
discrimination based on sex in any school receiving federal financial aid, 
from preschool through graduate programs.26 It was not until 1986, 
however, that courts permitted victims of sexual assault to bring successful 
lawsuits under a theory of sex discrimination.27 This made similar Title IX 
challenges possible, and in a series of cases in the late 1990s, the Supreme 
Court held that sexual violence is a form of Title IX discrimination for 
which individuals can bring suit against educational institutions.28 
In addition to private causes of action brought under Title IX, the ban 
on sex discrimination within education is governmentally enforced against 
 
 23 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2012). 
 24 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS OF TITLE IX 2 
(2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/06/20/titleixreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SXV9-9LR9]; UNITED EDUCATORS, UNDERSTANDING HOW AND WHY TITLE IX 
REGULATES CAMPUS SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1 (2015), https://www.ue.org/uploadedFiles/
History%20of%20Title%20IX.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR22-U5YW]. 
 25 § 1681(a). 
 26 § 1681(c) (defining the institutions subject to regulation). 
 27 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–69 (1986) (finding that sexual 
harassment constitutes sex discrimination in an employment context). 
 28 See, e.g., Davis ex rel. Lashonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) 
(creating liability for schools based on deliberate indifference to student-on-student sexual harassment); 
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283–84 (1998) (allowing private suits against 
schools based on student sexual harassment by teachers); see also UNITED EDUCATORS, supra note 24, 
at 3 (discussing the impact of Davis and Gebser on Title IX’s reach). 
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schools by OCR,29 a branch of the U.S. Department of Education headed by 
the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights.30 Schools have the obligation to 
address complaints of sexual harassment because they are uniquely situated 
to provide remedies that criminal adjudications cannot.31 If OCR finds that 
a school knew or should have known about any kind of sexual harassment 
on its campus and did not properly address it, then the agency will usually 
begin an investigation into the school’s policies and procedures.32 
Investigations leading to a finding that the school has violated Title IX 
often require that the school agree with the terms of a “resolution 
agreement,”33 which reflects the school’s acknowledgement of necessary 
changes to ensure compliance with Title IX.34 OCR is able to exact 
compliance with these agreements because it wields the power to revoke 
federal funding from schools, and though OCR has never used that power, 
it is a formidable threat.35 
The text of Title IX is vague and, because it does not explicitly cover 
sexual harassment, subsequent regulations have instructed schools about 
their responsibilities in preventing and combatting sexual assault. In 1997, 
OCR published a document entitled “Sexual Harassment Guidance: 
Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third 
Parties”36 and issued a revised version of that guidance in 2001.37 Much of 
the language remained the same between the two versions,38 and both 
emphasized the importance of “prompt and equitable” grievance 
 
 29 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, HELPING TO ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO 
EDUCATION 1 (2012), https://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/ocr/report-to-president-2009-12.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WAS7-Y37C]. 
 30 Id. at ii. 
 31 See Anderson, supra note 14, at 1974 (“For example, schools can facilitate changes in living 
situations or classes as necessary, or prohibit an alleged perpetrator from contacting the complainant.”). 
 32 See UNITED EDUCATORS, supra note 24, at 3. 
 33 See id.; infra notes 53–54. 
 34 Jennifer Garrett, Office for Civil Rights (OCR) Title IX Investigations: What to Expect, CAMPUS 
L. CONSIDERED (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.campuslawconsidered.com/office-for-civil-rights-ocr-title-
ix-investigations-what-to-expect [https://perma.cc/6Z2N-4T6F]. 
 35 UNITED EDUCATORS, supra note 24, at 3. 
 36 Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (Mar. 13, 1997) 
 37 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE ii 
(2001), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.html#Guidance 
[https://perma.cc/VGZ2-UK5H]. 
 38 However, there were a few changes in the 2001 guidance that were aimed at addressing how 
enforcement would differ from the standards put in place by recent Supreme Court decisions. See 
UNITED EDUCATORS, supra note 24, at 3 (referring to Supreme Court decisions such as Davis ex rel. 
Lashonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999), and Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283–84 (1998)). 
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procedures when students file sexual assault complaints.39 An important 
difference between the two, however, is that the 2001 guidance went 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking.40 That process is necessary to 
ensure that provisions within a document are given the force and effect of 
law.41 Thus, the 2001 guidance codified OCR’s standards for compliance 
with Title IX and is enforceable against educational institutions. 
The agency provided the next update to OCR’s enforcement standards 
in 2011 when it published the DCL. The DCL did not undergo notice-and-
comment rulemaking, but it added details to Title IX standards that the 
2001 guidance document omitted.42 The agency designated the DCL as a 
“significant guidance document”43 based on the definition set out by the 
Office of Management and Budget.44 Under this definition, the DCL 
embodies “interpretive rules of general applicability and statements of 
 
 39  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 37, at 19; Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 36, at 
12,043. 
 40 Notice of the revised guidance was published on November 2, 2000, in the Federal Register, and 
the final document was available at the same location on January 19, 2001. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
supra note 37, at ii. 
 41 Documents carrying the “force and effect of law” are those like legislative rules that are binding 
on a regulated entity, while nonlegislative rules that do not have such force cannot be categorically 
imposed upon the regulated entity. See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 465, 475 (2013) (“The Supreme Court has explained that legislative rules carry the ‘force and 
effect of law’ while nonlegislative rules do not.” (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 
(1979))); see also infra Part II (discussing the difference between different kinds of administrative rules 
and how courts determine into which category a document falls). 
 42 For example, it required specific procedures for the adjudications, detailing what kind of 
interviews students may conduct, how parties may present witnesses, and how much information parties 
should have access to. See 2011 DCL, supra note 4, at 11. 
 43 Id. at 1 n.1. 
 44 Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3434 (Jan. 25, 2007). A 
“significant guidance document” is defined as: 
[A] guidance document disseminated to regulated entities or the general public that may 
reasonably be anticipated to: (i) Lead to an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more 
or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, 
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments 
or communities; or (ii) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken 
or planned by another agency; or (iii) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, 
grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (iv) Raise 
novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the 
principles set forth in Executive Order 12866, as further amended. Under the Bulletin, significant 
guidance documents include interpretive rules of general applicability and statements of general 
policy that have the effects described in Section I(4)(i)–(iv). 
Id. (emphasis added). The Office of Management and Budget is the body responsible for overseeing the 
administration of federal agencies. See THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb [https://perma.cc/S7RX-Y963] (listing some of the Office’s 
responsibilities as “[m]anagement, including oversight of agency performance, human capital, Federal 
procurement, financial management, and information technology” and “[r]egulatory policy, including 
coordination and review of all significant Federal regulations by executive agencies”). 
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general policy.”45 The DCL clarified previous standards, including the 
requirement that schools give both the accuser and the accused equal access 
to information used in sexual assault proceedings46 and use a preponderance 
of the evidence standard in those adjudications.47 The preponderance 
standard is the most significant and contested change because no standard 
of proof was previously articulated in the 2001 guidance.48 Until 2011, 
educational institutions were free to set their own standards of proof,49 
though only one in five schools identified one in their sexual harassment 
codes.50 
After the DCL’s publication, OCR responded to some of the 
document’s critics51 via letters written by the Assistant Secretary during the 
Obama Administration, Catherine Lhamon.52 In spite of the criticism, the 
agency continued to create DCL-provision-based resolution agreements 
with institutions it investigated for deficient sexual assault regulations.53 
Some of the agreements were made public,54 and other schools were able to 
look to them as an indication of OCR’s intent to enforce certain provisions. 
In 2014, the Obama Administration furthered its crackdown on 
universities by assembling the White House Task Force to Protect Students 
from Sexual Assault.55 A resulting report, accompanied by a lengthy 
questions and answers document, largely echoed the requirements of the 
 
 45 Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. at 3434. 
 46 See 2011 DCL, supra note 4, at 11. 
 47 See id. at 10–11. 
 48 Creeley, supra note 15 (identifying the problems and concerns raised by “OCR’s new 
requirements”). Substantive arguments against the preponderance standard are addressed later in this 
Note. See infra Part IV. 
 49 The majority of schools with a stated standard of proof utilized the preponderance of the 
evidence standard, while some (mostly Ivy League schools) used a clear and convincing standard of 
proof. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 1986 and accompanying text. 
 50 See id. at 1986-87. 
 51 See infra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
 52 See, e.g., Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., to Senator James Lankford (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/items/biz/pdf/
DEPT.%20of%20EDUCATION%20RESPONSE%20TO%20LANKFORD%20LETTER%202-17-
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6Y4-Z3DW]. 
 53 See generally Katie Jo Baumgardner, Note, Resisting Rulemaking: Challenging the Montana 
Settlement’s Title IX Sexual Harassment Blueprint, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1813 (2014) (discussing 
the use of resolution agreements in these situations, specifically as related to the University of Montana, 
and the impact such agreements have on the university in question). 
 54 See, e.g., RESOLUTION AGREEMENT AMONG THE UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA – MISSOULA, THE 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES SECTION AND 
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/montanaagree.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9V4-Q4LZ]. 
 55 See UNITED EDUCATORS, supra note 24, at 4. 
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DCL and reiterated the mandatory preponderance standard.56 Additionally, 
around the same time that the questions and answers document was 
released, OCR increased enforcement of Title IX nationwide.57 Between the 
time of the DCL’s publication in April 2011 and October 2017, OCR 
launched more than 440 investigations into the sexual assault standards at 
universities, over 350 of which remain unresolved.58 
OCR has not disseminated any further written guidance after the DCL, 
though Secretary DeVos announced a departmental intent to “launch a 
transparent notice-and-comment process” during a speech at George Mason 
University in September 2017.59 In the same speech, Secretary DeVos also 
expressed her belief that the “[Obama] administration weaponized the 
Office for Civil Rights to work against schools and against students.”60 
Additionally, the Secretary denounced the application of the preponderance 
of the evidence standard.61 The DCL is, therefore, no longer the policy of 
the Department of Education.62 However, several questions remain: 
whether the DCL was ever a legitimate exercise of nonlegislative 
rulemaking, if similar documents can replace it, and whether any new 
guidance or rule should adopt the same evidentiary standard for campus 
sexual assault adjudications. 
II.   THE BACKDROP: AGENCY RULEMAKING STANDARDS 
Though many believe that increased enforcement is necessary given 
the pervasiveness of the campus sexual assault problem,63 that does not 
mean that all of OCR’s enforcement efforts have been legitimate. But, 
before analyzing the validity of the DCL, it is necessary to survey the 
 
 56 See id.; CATHERINE E. LHAMON, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS 
AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7W8-J8PR]. 
 57 See Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/ [https://perma.cc/5W3K-JX2V]. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See Susan Svrluga, Transcript: Betsy DeVos’s Remarks on Campus Sexual Assault, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/09/07/transcript-betsy-
devoss-remarks-on-campus-sexual-assault/ [https://perma.cc/XF6H-QNDJ]. At the time of this writing, 
however, the Trump administration had proposed no new rule. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See 2017 DCL, supra note 21 (withdrawing the 2011 DCL as a statement of policy and 
guidance). 
 63 See, e.g., KATHARINE K. BAKER ET AL., TITLE IX & THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE: A 
WHITE PAPER 1 (2016), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Title-IX-
Preponderance-White-Paper-signed-10.3.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZC8-JVAY]. 
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administrative law scheme that gives OCR power to enforce Title IX 
regulations. 
The United States uses a complex system in which agencies specify 
the proper implementation of federal statutes, including those that impact 
the receipt of federal funding.64 Agencies, like the Department of 
Education’s OCR, wield the power to create “rules” that bind the agency, 
courts, and the entities regulated by the agency.65 These rules govern how 
the agency enforces the laws it has a statutory mandate to administer. 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)66 establishes how agencies 
must promulgate rules, which the statute defines broadly as “the whole or a 
part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future 
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”67 The 
APA also creates exemptions from rulemaking in situations where 
substantive rights are not at issue.68 Under these exemptions, agencies can 
create documents that resemble enforceable rules using less arduous 
procedures. Rules that are created through the rulemaking process are given 
“the force and effect of law” and are hence termed “legislative rules,” 
whereas documents that are promulgated under one of the exemptions 
cannot be given such force and are thus called “nonlegislative rules.”69 An 
understanding of these principles is necessary to apply them to the DCL 
and determine its validity as a nonlegislative rule. This Part therefore 
discusses how agencies promulgate rules, how agencies can use 
exemptions to avoid the rulemaking process, and how courts differentiate 
between rules promulgated with or without utilization of an exemption 
when agency enforcement is challenged. 
A.   When Legislative Rulemaking Is a Requirement 
There are two types of legislative rulemaking processes: formal and 
informal.70 The formal rulemaking process requires lengthy trial-like 
proceedings and is rarely used unless the agency is obligated to do so by 
 
 64 See, e.g., A-Z INDEX OF U.S. GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, USA.GOV (2017), 
https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/a [https://perma.cc/PR3G-BUS8]. 
 65 See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.6, at 471 (5th ed. 2010). 
 66 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012). 
 67 § 551(4). 
 68 § 553(b). Substantive rights are not at issue when the agency is creating “interpretive rules, 
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” Id. 
 69 Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like–
Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1327–28 (1992). 
 70 See §§ 553, 556, 557. However, more specific organic statutory provisions may supplement or 
supersede the APA’s requirements. § 559. 
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the underlying, “organic” statute it administers.71 Informal rulemaking is 
much more common and is generally referred to as “notice-and-comment” 
rulemaking because of its requirement that agencies give notice of the 
proposed rule and provide time for the public to comment on it.72 Notice-
and-comment rulemaking is required by § 553 of the APA, which describes 
the process as one in which the agency must issue notice of the proposed 
rule, receive comments from the public on its substance, and ultimately 
publish the final rule with “a concise general statement of [its] basis and 
purpose.”73 
Though it is still more attractive than the cumbersome formal process, 
notice-and-comment rulemaking has become increasingly burdensome 
since the 1960s74 as Congress, the President, and the courts have added 
requirements.75 The present process is complicated and requires far more 
time and resources than many agencies are able to devote, given 
understaffing and underfunding.76 Some scholars believe that the agency’s 
loss of time and resources through notice-and-comment procedures makes 
the process overly burdensome.77 Additionally, scholars argue that the 
onerous notice-and-comment process is part of what drives agencies to 
utilize exemptions more often.78 Whatever the reason for their creation, 
many documents, like the DCL, do not go through notice-and-comment 
 
 71 See §§ 553(c), 556, 557; see also United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 240–41 
(1973) (requiring specific language in statute to trigger formal rulemaking procedures). 
 72 § 553(c)–(d). 
 73 See § 553(c); see also PIERCE, supra note 65, at 594 (paraphrasing the requirements of the rule). 
 74 The push was primarily made by the D.C. Circuit during the 1960s and 1970s, and all branches 
of government have joined in adding requirements. David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative 
Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 283–84 (2010). This continues to happen, 
despite the Supreme Court’s determination in 1978 that § 553 of the APA “established the maximum 
procedural requirements” that Congress wished to impose on agencies. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). 
 75 Congress has increased the burden on agency rulemaking by requiring the agency to review 
proposed rules’ impact on the environment, small businesses, and local governments, while the White 
House now requires proposed rules to undergo review by the Office of Management and Budget. See 
Franklin, supra note 74, at 283 (discussing these and other added requirements). Courts, particularly the 
D.C. Circuit, seem to question agency decisionmaking at every turn, demand replies to public 
comments, and much more. Id. 
 76 See PIERCE, supra note 65, at 601 (“[S]ome agencies have concluded that they cannot issue a 
major rule in less than a decade.”); Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 
67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 79 (2015) (“[I]nvoking an exemption to the APA’s notice-and-comment process 
takes far less staff time than issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), reading and responding 
to the ensuing comments, and modifying the rule as appropriate.”). 
 77 See, e.g., Raso, supra note 76, at 78–79. 
 78 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 
41 DUKE L. J. 1385, 1386 (1992). 
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rulemaking, and so their validity hinges on whether they fit into one of the 
exemptions from legislative rulemaking. 
B.   When Legislative Rulemaking Is Not a Requirement 
Agencies utilize exemptions from notice-and-comment when seeking 
to streamline enforcement of ambiguous statutes without the costs and 
burdens associated with legislative rulemaking.79 They allow agencies to 
issue proposed rules without the public dialogue required by the notice-
and-comment process. As appealing as this option sounds for agencies, it 
can only be used in limited circumstances. A proposed rule is exempt from 
rulemaking procedures only if it fits into one of the two categories named 
in the APA. Under § 553(b)(3), an agency action is specifically exempt 
from notice-and-comment rulemaking if it: (A) issues “interpretative rules, 
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice,” or (B) “for good cause finds” that notice and comment is 
impracticable and unnecessary in the specific circumstances.80 Because the 
DCL was promulgated as a significant guidance document, a category that 
by definition includes both interpretive rules and general statements of 
policy,81 this Note focuses on the exemptions in subsection (A). 
While the APA does not provide definitions for the terms interpretive 
rule and policy statement, working definitions are set forth in the 1947 
Attorney General’s Manual on the Act.82 The Manual states that 
interpretive rules “advise the public of the agency’s construction of the 
statutes and rules which it administers,” while policy statements “advise the 
public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to 
exercise a discretionary power.”83 The vagueness of these definitions means 
that courts have had to define the contours of each exemption. 
 
 79 See Franklin, supra note 74, at 303–04 (“[Nonlegislative rulemaking] provides relatively swift 
and accurate notice to the public of how the agency interprets the statutes or rules that it administers and 
how it intends to carry out its statutory mandate. In particular, the use of interpretive rules allows 
agencies to clarify their understanding of ambiguous statutes or rules without initiating a new round of 
notice and comment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 80 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2012). 
 81 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 82 TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (reprt. ed. 1973) ; see also Franklin, supra note 74, at 286 
(noting that courts have frequently looked to this manual as a guide to agency terminology). 
 83 See CLARK, supra note 82, at 30 n.3. The Supreme Court used this manual to interpret the APA 
in Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 
Co., 514 U.S. 122, 126–27 (1995), and Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979). 
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Interpretive rules give substance to the language of a preexisting 
statute or legislative rule that has a sufficiently concrete meaning.84 Thus, 
true interpretive rules do not add new content: they only elucidate previous 
legislative terms and phrases.85 While the limits of this exemption are 
unclear, the D.C. Circuit has frequently allowed agencies to issue 
interpretive rules that create tests to decipher ambiguous statutory terms 
(such as “interurban railway”86 and “average pay”87) or to remind regulated 
entities about their duties.88 Though courts give agency interpretations 
deference, interpretive rules may not create new requirements or laws.89 
Policy statements are agency statements that advise the public about 
how the agency intends to operate.90 Unlike interpretive rules, these 
statements do not seek to build upon or define existing legislation.91 
Statements of policy also may “not impose any rights and obligations on an 
operator.”92 Instead, they create new policies to inform regulated entities.93 
For example, in American Bus Association v. United States, the D.C. 
Circuit found that tentative language indicating an agency’s expressed 
 
 84 See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (finding that the 
agency’s interpretation of a statute was valid because there was no convincing alternative meaning for 
the statutory language in question); see also Anthony, supra note 69, at 1335 (discussing the meaning 
of the phrase interpretive rules). In other words, “[a]n interpretative rule is one which does not have the 
full force and effect of a substantive [i.e., legislative] rule but which is in the form of an explanation of 
particular terms in an Act.” Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952). 
 85 See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that 
interpretive rules arise when “an agency is merely explicating Congress’ desires,” not when “the agency 
is adding substantive content of its own”). 
 86 See Gibson Wine, 194 F.2d at 331 (highlighting this term as an example of something to which 
an agency can give meaning via an interpretive rule). 
 87 See Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 559 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). 
 88 See, e.g., Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that answers to 
frequently asked questions, even if containing specifics about the agency’s enforcement standards, are 
interpretive). 
 89 See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“If an 
agency . . . treats [an allegedly interpretive] document in the same manner as it treats a legislative rule, 
if it bases enforcement actions on the policies or interpretations formulated in the document . . . then the 
agency’s document is for all practical purposes ‘binding.’”); see also Anthony, supra note 69, at 1324 
(noting the result of cases analyzing interpretive rules). 
 90 See CLARK, supra note 82, at 30 n.3. 
 91 See United Techs. Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719 (D.C. Cir 1987) (policy statements are 
“rules in which the agency sought to fill gaps and inconsistencies left by the statutory scheme . . . [and] 
picked up where the statute left off; ‘by no stretch of the imagination could [they] have been derived by 
mere “interpretation” of the instructions of Congress’” (quoting Citizens to Save Spencer Cty. v. U.S. 
EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1979))). 
 92 See 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Texaco v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 412 F.2d 740, 
744 (3d Cir. 1969)). 
 93 See Anthony, supra note 69, at 1324; see also Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of the Navy, 
843 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“A binding policy is an oxymoron.”). 
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preference for a certain implementation method qualified as a policy 
statement but that a recitation of factors that guided an agency’s decisions 
did not.94 If an agency enforces a policy, the policy statement alone is not a 
sufficient justification and a court will question whether the document was 
a legitimate use of an exemption.95 
C.   Courts and the Legitimacy of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements 
Though interpretive rules and policy statements are different, neither 
carries the force and effect of law.96 Parties can challenge, and courts can 
rule illegitimate, interpretive rules and policy statements that agencies 
enforce against regulated entities.97 To evaluate whether an agency has 
improperly labeled something an interpretive rule or policy statement, a 
court must determine whether the substance of the rule is actually 
legislative—meant to bind the regulated entity—and thus illegitimate.98 In 
this analysis, the distinction between interpretive rules and policy 
statements is crucial because each type of nonlegislative rule can only serve 
specific purposes. Because interpretive rules and policy statements perform 
discrete functions, courts use different analyses to determine whether the 
nonlegislative rule operates as permitted and is thereby valid. 
A court first determines whether the document in question is an 
interpretive rule or a policy statement.99 To determine that, the court will 
consider whether the document is interpreting sufficiently concrete 
statutory language or language within a rule that has gone through notice-
and-comment procedures. If so, it is an interpretive rule.100 These rules 
 
 94 See Am. Bus Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 530. 
 95 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38–39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“When 
the agency applies the policy in a particular situation, it must be prepared to support the policy just as if 
the policy statement had never been issued. An agency cannot escape its responsibility to present 
evidence and reasoning supporting its substantive rules by announcing binding precedent in the form of 
a general statement of policy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 96 See Hickman, supra note 41, at 475 (“The Supreme Court has explained that legislative rules 
carry the ‘force and effect of law’ while nonlegislative rules do not.” (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 
441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979))). 
 97 See Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 411–12 (2007); see also Vietnam Veterans of Am., 843 F.2d at 537 
(“[S]tatements whose language, context and application suggest an intent to bind agency discretion and 
private party conduct—the sort of statements requiring compliance with § 553—will have that effect if 
valid; interpretive rules or policy statements will not, regardless of their validity.”). 
 98 “If a document expresses a change in substantive law or policy (that is not an interpretation) 
which the agency intends to make binding, or administers with binding effect, the agency may not rely 
upon the statutory exemption for policy statements, but must observe the APA’s legislative rulemaking 
procedures.” Anthony, supra note 69, at 1355 (footnote and emphasis omitted). 
 99 See id. at 1339. 
 100 See supra Section II.B. 
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generally withstand the court’s scrutiny as long as they do not alter 
substantive rights.101 If a document issued by an agency is truly interpretive, 
then it is a valid form of nonlegislative rulemaking,102 and the inquiry into 
the rule’s legitimacy can end here.103 On the other hand, if a court 
determines that the nonlegislative document is not interpreting concrete 
statutory language, then its validity will depend on whether it is a valid 
policy statement.104 If the courts determine it is neither an interpretive rule 
nor a policy statement, then the document is actually a legislative rule that 
should have gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Generally, courts can make determinations about interpretive rules 
easily.105 The tricky part is determining whether a policy statement is 
performing a permissible function or if it is operating as an improperly 
promulgated legislative rule. Unfortunately, courts do not simply look at a 
noninterpretive document that has not gone through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking and state that it must be a policy statement.106 Not only is the 
test more complicated but it has also varied from case to case, so the lower 
federal courts have proposed several different means to distinguish 
legislative rules from policy statements.107 The differences between the 
existing tests largely turn on how much trust the court places in an agency’s 
decision about whether to engage in legislative rulemaking. 
A brief survey of two judicially created tests will lay the foundation 
for their application to the DCL. One test is the “agency label” test, in 
which the court essentially chooses to adopt the agency’s characterization 
of the rule.108 This test it is not used very often, however, because it is 
 
 101 See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045–46 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing previous 
cases in which courts had upheld or struck down interpretive rules). The D.C. Circuit has treated 
substantive rights as those that would create a cause of action if they were infringed. See, e.g., JEM 
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing the ability to file a license application 
as a substantive right, which could not be infringed by a narrow time window for filing in Ranger v. 
FCC, 294 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir 1961)). 
 102 See Anthony, supra note 69, at 1339. 
 103 Whether the DCL qualifies for the interpretive rule exception is discussed in Part III, infra. 
 104 See Anthony, supra note 69, at 1339. 
 105 See supra Section II.B. 
 106 See Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 
384 (“Because their legal effect is difficult to determine, [policy statements and interpretive rules] 
typically resist easy placement in legislative or nonlegislative pigeonholes.”). Some scholars, though, 
suggest that courts should adopt a single test. See, e.g., William Funk, When is a “Rule” a Regulation? 
Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN L. REV. 659, 663 
(2002) (stating that courts should use a “notice-and-comment test” requiring that anything that has not 
gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking should be considered an interpretive rule or policy 
statement). 
 107 See Franklin, supra note 74, at 278. 
 108 See Asimow, supra note 106, at 389–90 (naming the test and presenting illustrative cases). 
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extremely deferential to the agency’s decisionmaking in an area where the 
agency has acted without much oversight.109 
The most commonly utilized test is the “legal effect” test, which asks 
whether a challenged rule creates new legal rights or duties for regulated 
entities.110 The courts that apply this test often begin by looking at the 
agency’s characterization of the statement111 but will then consider whether 
a regulated entity’s discretion to act in a certain manner has been 
relinquished.112 If it finds that the result of the statement is “not simply to 
limit administrative discretion, but to abolish it,” then the statement is 
considered legislative.113 Moreover, in a variant of the test that is used when 
an agency has a track record of implementing the standards in the 
document, courts will look at whether the agency has actually bound itself 
to the pronouncements made within the statement.114 If the statement looks 
like a “press release” or another “informational device” that an agency 
cannot use as grounds for enforcement, then it is properly considered a 
 
 109 See id. at 390 (“[M]any courts have declared that labels are entitled to judicial deference, but 
cannot be dispositive of the issue of the proper characterization of a rule.”). For that reason, agency 
labels are rarely determinative. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171–
73 (2007) (holding in part that a rule in a document entitled “Interpretations” was actually legislative 
because it was promulgated via notice-and-comment rulemaking); First Bancorporation v. Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 728 F.2d 434, 438 (10th Cir. 1984) (treating a policy statement in 
informal adjudication as legislative rule); Am. Bus Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 531 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (also finding a policy statement to be a legislative rule). Moreover, the viability of the agency 
label test is questionable. See Asimow, supra note 106, at 389 n.39 (noting that the Senate Judiciary 
Committee has criticized courts’ use of the agency label test); Franklin, supra note 74, at 287 n.52 
(suggesting that the “agency’s label” test may have been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court). 
 110 Franklin, supra note 74, at 288; see also Am. Bus Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 529 (“[A] ‘general 
statement of policy’ is one that does not impose any rights and obligations on an operator . . . .” 
(quoting Texaco v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969))); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“The critical distinction between a substantive 
rule and a general statement of policy is the different practical effect that these two types of 
pronouncements have in subsequent administrative proceedings.”). 
 111 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 39 (“Often the agency’s own characterization of a 
particular order provides some indication of the nature of the announcement.”). 
 112 See, e.g., Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[T]o the extent that 
the directive ‘narrowly limits administrative discretion’ or establishes a binding norm . . . it effectively 
replaces agency discretion with a new binding rule of substantive law.”) (quoting Ryder Truck Lines, 
Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir.))); Am. Bus Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 531–32 (finding 
that a pronouncement by the Interstate Commerce Commission was determinative of rights and 
therefore legislative). 
 113 See Am. Bus Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 532. 
 114 See U.S. Tel. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir 1994) (“The distinction between the two 
types of agency pronouncements has not proved an easy one to draw, but we have said repeatedly that it 
turns on an agency’s intention to bind itself to a particular legal policy position.” (citing Pub. Citizen, 
Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 940 F.2d 679, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. 
v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987))). 
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policy statement.115 Conversely, substantive legislative rules establish 
“binding norms” that agencies may enforce and, thus, must go through 
formal or informal rulemaking.116 
The legal effect test thus boils down to two inquiries: (1) whether the 
statement is essentially creating new substantive law, and (2) whether the 
agency created it with the intent that it should have binding effects on the 
parties being regulated.117 If the court answers either inquiry in the 
affirmative, then the policy statement is actually legislative rulemaking that 
is illegitimate because it has not undergone notice-and-comment 
procedures.118 Invalid rulemaking is a procedural error, and upon finding 
that it has occurred, a court generally vacates the document and requires 
notice-and-comment rulemaking to continue enforcement.119 In fact, courts 
do not evaluate the substance of the document until it has gone through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.120 
Even with its flaws, the courts’ analytical process provides a method 
of understanding the DCL as an administrative document and how courts 
may interpret other similar forms of guidance when they are enacted and 
enforced. 
III.  THE CENTRAL CONFLICT: THE DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER AS AN 
EXERCISE OF NONLEGISLATIVE RULEMAKING 
Once a nonlegislative rule is created, a court will only evaluate its 
validity if a lawsuit is filed to challenge the agency’s enforcement actions. 
Due to the Obama Administration’s aggressive enforcement of Title IX,121 
several students found responsible for campus sexual assaults have 
challenged the procedures underlying campus adjudications.122 Spurred on 
 
 115 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 39. 
 116 See, e.g., id. at 38 & n.18 (citing Reginald Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in 
Overestimation, 60 YALE L.J. 581, 598 (1951)). 
 117 See Anthony, supra note 69, at 1327. 
 118 See id. at 1322, 1327. 
 119 See id. at 1355; cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(vacating a document for failure to comply with the requirements of the Clean Air Act, which are 
similar to those of the APA). 
 120 See Anthony, supra note 69, at 1318. 
 121 See Gersen, supra note 15. 
 122 See Anderson, supra note 14, at 1988–89 (discussing a few recent federal cases that have agreed 
that certain basic due process requirements were not being met in school adjudications, but noting that 
all of those “due process requirements are consistent with OCR guidance”); Tovia Smith, For Students 
Accused of Campus Rape, Legal Victories Win Back Rights, NPR (Oct. 15, 2015, 4:45 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/10/15/446083439/for-students-accused-of-campus-rape-legal-victories-win-
back-rights [https://perma.cc/CK79-93Y2] (detailing a few court cases brought by students found 
responsible for campus sexual assault). 
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by the efforts of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education 
(FIRE),123 and no doubt encouraged by letters written by law professors124 
and Senator James Lankford of Oklahoma,125 recent lawsuits have 
challenged the validity of the 2011 DCL directly.126 These plaintiffs argue 
that the DCL is an invalid exercise of legislative rulemaking because it did 
not go through notice-and-comment rulemaking.127 
This Part focuses on one such plaintiff, John Doe, who filed his initial 
complaint against OCR in June 2016.128 The arguments therein frame the 
debate surrounding the DCL, especially as it pertains to the preponderance 
of the evidence standard. Doe’s complaint represents the perspective of 
advocates who view the DCL as a flawed document that should not require 
schools to use the preponderance standard in campus sexual assault 
adjudications.129 At the time that Doe’s complaint was filed, the Assistant 
Secretary for OCR was Catherine Lhamon, who staunchly supported the 
legitimacy of the DCL as a nonlegislative rule.130 Lhamon’s written 
 
 123 See, e.g., Creeley, supra note 15 (discussing FIRE’s 2011 campaign to roll back OCR’s new 
mandates); Greg Lukianoff, OCR’s April 4 Letter and Opposition in the National Media, FIRE (Dec. 
26, 2011), https://www.thefire.org/ocrs-april-4-letter-and-opposition-in-the-national-media 
[https://perma.cc/WF63-R8P4]. 
 124 See Harvard University Professors, supra note 11 (“Harvard has adopted procedures for 
deciding cases of alleged sexual misconduct which lack the most basic elements of fairness and due 
process, are overwhelmingly stacked against the accused, and are in no way required by Title IX law or 
regulation.”); Penn Law Professors, supra note 11 (“[W]e believe that OCR’s approach exerts improper 
pressure upon universities to adopt procedures that do not afford fundamental fairness.”). 
 125 See Letter from Senator James Lankford to John B. King, Acting Secretary of Education 1 (Jan. 
7, 2016), https://www.scribd.com/doc/294821262/Sen-Lankford-letter-to-Education-Department 
[https://perma.cc/HV9W-PUQ3] (stating that Lankford “believe[s] that the Dear Colleague letters 
advance substantive and binding regulatory policies that are effectively regulations . . . [and] should 
have been promulgated subject to notice-and-comment procedures”). 
 126 See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Doe v. Lhamon, No. 1:16-cv-01158-RC (D.D.C. June 16, 2016); 
Complaint at 3, Neal v. Colo. State Univ.–Pueblo, No. 1:16-cv-00873-RM-CBS (D. Colo. May 4, 
2016). 
 127 See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Doe, No. 1:16-cv-01158-RC; Complaint at 3–4, Neal, No. 1:16-cv-
00873-RM-CBS. 
 128 See Complaint at 23, Doe, No. 1:16-cv-01158-RC. In a slight amendment to the original 
complaint, Oklahoma Wesleyan joined as a plaintiff in the suit because the school “reasonably fears 
that it is just a matter of time before OCR threatens it with enforcement action” based on its 
noncompliance with the preponderance standard. Amended Complaint at 20, Doe, No. 1:16-cv-01158-
RC (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2016). Wesleyan’s involvement, however, is outside the scope of this Note. 
 129 See supra note 124 (presenting arguments that the DCL’s preponderance of the evidence 
standard creates concerns about procedural fairness). 
 130 Lhamon has continued to stand by her arguments since stepping down from her position and 
learning of the new Department of Education’s denunciation of the DCL. See Susan Svrluga & Nick 
Anderson, DeVos Decries “Failed System” on Campus Sexual Assault, Vows to Replace It, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/09/07/protesters-
gather-anticipating-devos-speech-on-campus-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/4KZ4-YQAZ] (“The 
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statements and filings in the case provide the backbone for the opposing 
contention to Doe’s: they contend that OCR was within its rights in 
implementing and enforcing the DCL. 
Though Doe v. Lhamon now remains in limbo131 due to the Trump 
Administration’s expressed intent to revisit the language of the DCL,132 a 
discussion of Doe is instructive on three fronts. First, it allows us to define 
some of the limits of Title IX nonlegislative rulemaking and better 
understand why the DCL can be revoked so easily. Second, Doe 
illuminates the criticism that surrounds the DCL and sheds light on its 
procedural illegitimacy. And, third, it might inform OCR’s approach 
moving forward because the questions that underscore the case appear to 
have indirectly given rise to the Trump Administration’s decision to 
rescind support for the DCL.133 
A.   Doe v. Lhamon and the Arguments Against the Dear Colleague Letter 
The Doe complaint alleged that the agency’s alteration of previous 
administrative rule requirements, in particular the imposition of the 
preponderance standard, exceeded OCR’s authority to enforce Title IX.134 
Doe contended that the DCL was not interpretive because the 1997 and 
2001 guidance documents issued by OCR defined six elements of “Prompt 
and Equitable Grievance Procedures,”135 none of which require any specific 
standard of proof.136 Additionally, he argued that the preponderance 
standard was a new substantive requirement that constitutes rulemaking 
under the APA.137 
Catherine Lhamon, in her capacity as then-Assistant Secretary for 
OCR, argued on a motion to dismiss that the language from the DCL “does 
 
[DeVos] speech pretty clearly sent a message that sexual assault will not be taken seriously by this 
administration. That could not be more damaging.”). 
 131 See Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to Hold Case in Abeyance, at 1, Doe, No. 1:16-cv-01158-
RC (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2017). 
 132 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 133 See Jeannie Suk Gersen, Betsy DeVos, Title IX, and the “Both Sides” Approach to Sexual 
Assault, NEW YORKER (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/betsy-devos-title-
ix-and-the-both-sides-approach-to-sexual-assault (quoting Betsy DeVos as saying: “Any school that 
refuses to take seriously a student who reports sexual misconduct is one that discriminates. And any 
school that uses a system biased toward finding a student responsible for sexual misconduct also 
commits discrimination.”). 
 134 See Amended Complaint at 3, Doe, No. 1:16-cv-01158-RC (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2016). 
 135 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 37, at 20; Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 36, at 
12,044. 
 136 See Amended Complaint at 21, Doe, No. 1:16-cv-01158-RC. 
 137 See id. Plaintiffs also stated that there was no justification for the preponderance standard 
because it has no relation to sexual misconduct investigations and that the comparison to federal civil 
rights lawsuits is improper. Id. 
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not add requirements to applicable law,” and that the preponderance 
standard is merely an interpretation of the phrase “equitable” in the 2001 
Guidance.138 Similarly, in a letter to Senator James Lankford of Oklahoma, 
an outspoken critic of OCR’s efforts to reform campus sexual assault 
adjudications,139 Lhamon explained that the preponderance standard 
“stem[s] from the Department’s Title IX regulations, including, but not 
limited to, the requirement that educational institutions adopt ‘grievance 
procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution’ of 
complaints.”140 In that same letter, Lhamon also pointed out that the 
preponderance standard was required in resolution agreements made with 
schools prior to the promulgation of the 2011 DCL.141 Under the agency 
label test,142 this supports the assertion that the 2011 DCL is simply a 
clarification of OCR’s standards and was issued merely to provide notice of 
the department’s construal of Title IX.143 This test is disfavored,144 however, 
and thus it is unclear how determinative the agency’s label is. 
Indeed, Doe’s argument is more persuasive because evidence supports 
the position that the preponderance standard embodied in the DCL is not 
interpretive. Under the legal effect test, the language, tone, and impact of 
the DCL all weigh toward finding that the rule should have undergone 
notice-and-comment procedures. The DCL qualifies for neither relevant 
exemption to notice-and-comment rulemaking because: (1) it is not 
interpretive and thereby must be analyzed as a policy statement, and (2) as 
a policy statement, the DCL was improperly enforced as if it was a binding 
document. 
As the Doe complaint points out, Lhamon’s assertion that the 
preponderance standard is an interpretation of “prompt and equitable”  does 
not stand up to scrutiny. The language of the 2001 guidance document may 
be vague enough to encompass a standard of proof, but that vagueness is its 
 
 138 See Motion to Dismiss at 2, 8, Doe, No. 1:16-cv-01158-RC (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2016) (quoting a 
litigation exhibit); see also 2011 DCL, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that any standard other than the 
preponderance standard is not “equitable”). 
 139 See Emma Brown, U.S. Senator: Education Dept. Overstepped Authority on Sexual Assault 
Complaints, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/01/
07/u-s-senator-education-department-overstepped-authority-on-sexual-assault-complaints 
[https://perma.cc/U3N2-B5CC]. 
 140  Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to 
Senator James Lankford, supra note 52 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (2000)). 
 141 See id. 
 142 See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 143 See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 144 See Anthony, supra note 69, at 1339. 
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downfall.145 The 2001 guidance sets forth the “prompt and equitable” 
factors as elements for evaluating a school’s grievance procedures,146 but it 
does not impose any affirmative measures on the schools themselves. 
Conversely, the DCL directive that schools must use the preponderance 
standard seems to be imposing an affirmative requirement for campus 
adjudications. That kind of “interpretation” is not an interpretation at all 
because it is creating a new substantive policy.147 Thus, the DCL can only 
be evaluated as a policy statement. 
In order to be a valid policy statement, the DCL cannot have 
practically binding effects.148 Just as a court using the legal effect test and 
its variant that is applied after an agency has made use of a promulgated 
document would, Doe underscored that OCR has been enforcing the 
preponderance of the evidence and other DCL standards against regulated 
entities.149 As the Doe complaint states, OCR has been using resolution 
agreements to require schools to adopt the preponderance standard.150 
Lhamon admitted as much in her letter to Senator Lankford, which 
acknowledged that OCR had a history of bringing schools into compliance 
with that standard.151 She also acknowledged that the OCR guidance 
documents are meant to “assist schools in understanding what policies and 
practices will lead OCR to initiate proceedings to terminate Federal 
financial assistance.”152 Lhamon’s latent promise to initiate proceedings is 
underscored by the reality that OCR was, indeed, requiring schools to alter 
their standard of proof to reflect the DCL’s preponderance mandate at that 
time.153  
 
 145 See id. (noting that courts must first determine “whether a given statement interprets sufficiently 
concrete statutory language as to qualify as interpretive” (emphasis added)). 
 146 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 37, at 20. 
 147 See Anthony, supra note 69, at 1339 n.161 (“But where the rules use the statutory words in a 
‘positive’ way—not merely to require refraining from unfair or deceptive acts but to require affected 
parties to perform affirmative acts to be safe from prosecution—it would seem hard to say they draw 
any tangible meaning from the statutory language. To the extent these rules are policy statements, as 
they are not interpretive.”). 
 148 See id. at 1332–33 (“An agency may use interpretive rules in a manner that makes them binding 
as a practical matter, but it may not so use policy documents.” (footnote omitted)). 
 149 See Amended Complaint at 12, Doe v. Lhamon, No. 1:16-cv-01158-RC (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 
2016). 
 150 See id. at 14–15, 18. 
 151 See Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to 
Senator James Lankford, supra note 52. 
 152  Id. (emphasis added). 
 153 See Jake New, The Wrong Standard, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Nov. 6, 2014, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/11/06/princeton-title-ix-agreement-higher-standard-proof-
sexual-assault-cases-last-legs [https://perma.cc/EWD6-MJ3G] (after OCR reached an agreement with 
Princeton, the school altered its adjudication standard to a preponderance of the evidence). 
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The Doe complaint mentions that at least twenty-four universities 
used a higher standard of proof prior to the DCL’s promulgation.154 
Additionally, there is no evidence that OCR was willing to approve a 
school’s Title IX procedures when a higher standard of proof was used.155 
Princeton University, the last Ivy League school to retain a higher standard 
of proof, shifted to the preponderance standard in 2014 after OCR’s finding 
that the school was not adjudicating claims “promptly and equitably.”156 
Many—and perhaps most—other universities have been compelled to 
proactively, or by threat of investigation, do the same and comply with the 
DCL.157 As a whole, these circumstances suggest that school administrators 
felt they were required to comply with the preponderance standard if they 
wished to retain their federal funding.158 That reality contradicts Lhamon’s 
statements that the DCL was not meant to have the “force and effect of 
law.”159 Under the legal effect test, practically binding effects such as these 
lead to a determination that the DCL is legislative.160 
Finally, turning to the tone and language of the DCL, there are further 
indications that use of the preponderance standard is binding and 
nonnegotiable for schools. The DCL states that a school “must use a 
preponderance of the evidence standard,” because higher standards “are . . . 
not equitable under Title IX.”161 Not only does the preponderance standard 
appear to be mandatory, but also the tone of the letter overall suggests that 
 
 154 See Amended Complaint at 12, Doe, No. 1:16-cv-01158. 
 155 See 2011 DCL supra note 4, at 11 (“Grievance procedures that use [a] higher standard [than the 
preponderance of the evidence] are inconsistent with the standard of proof established for violations of 
the civil rights laws, and are thus not equitable under Title IX. Therefore, preponderance of the 
evidence is the appropriate standard for investigating allegations of sexual harassment or violence.”). 
 156 See New, supra note 153 (“‘Princeton was one of the last holdouts,’ Sokolow said. ‘Off the top 
of my head, I can’t think of a single campus still using a higher standard. And that’s a very positive 
change.’”). 
 157 For instance, Harvard University, Michigan State University, the State University of New York, 
and Tufts University all changed their standard to preponderance after a Title IX investigation revealed 
that they were utilizing a higher standard of proof. See Jake New, Must vs. Should, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Feb. 25, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/02/25/colleges-frustrated-lack-
clarification-title-ix-guidance [https://perma.cc/7ZF9-GASW]; Harvard University Professors, supra 
note 11; see also New, supra note 153 (“Brett Sokolow, president of the National Center for Higher 
Education Risk Management, said that with Princeton adopting the lower standard and the department 
continuing to find colleges in violation of Title IX if they do not adopt it, there are ‘probably only a 
handful of colleges left’ who use a higher burden of proof.”). 
 158 Though no school has ever lost funding, it remains a powerful threat because almost every 
institution in the nation, save three, relies on it. See Baumgardner, supra note 53, at 1814. 
 159  Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to 
Senator James Lankford, supra note 52. 
 160 Hickman, supra note 41, at 479. 
 161 See 2011 DCL, supra note 4, at 11 (emphasis added). 
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it is an enforcement document.162 In all, the term must appears thirty-six 
times in the DCL, and many provisions state what schools are “required” to 
do.163 Although OCR disclaimed the notion that the DCL had any kind of 
legally binding effect, the actual text of the letter seems to explicitly tell 
schools what they must do to comply with Title IX. 
For all these reasons, the DCL was, from its inception, invalid and 
unenforceable. When creating the document, the Lhamon-led OCR tried to 
play both sides of the field, calling the DCL provisions interpretive while 
simultaneously adding substantive requirements that mandate schools’ 
compliance. Though OCR had good reasons for promulgating the DCL, it 
cannot legitimately effectuate its goals and the document should be ruled 
illegitimate if any legal challenges persist. 
B.   Implications Moving Forward 
Many of the arguments raised by Doe echo those of anti-DCL and 
preponderance standard commentators.164 Indeed, Secretary DeVos may 
have considered the arguments of advocates who disagree with the 
enforcement of the preponderance standard when she suggested that the 
Department of Education will consider changes to Title IX campus sexual 
assault standards during a speech at George Mason University.165 
Ultimately, the DCL was merely unenforceable policy guidance that could 
be overturned at any time. As the preference of OCR changes, as it often 
does between administrations, so may its decisions regarding the 
interpretation of various provisions of Title IX. Moving forward, any 
further specification of Title IX requirements for schools should undergo 
the notice-and-comment process. 
IV.  THE RESOLUTION: FIGHTING FOR THE PREPONDERANCE STANDARD 
Notwithstanding its procedural shortcomings, the legal community 
and administrators in higher education must recognize the importance of 
the DCL’s preponderance of the evidence standard. The next step toward 
legitimizing it should come in the form of commentary on any pending 
 
 162 For instance, Representative Virginia Foxx has argued that the Dear Colleague Letter is 
legislative and uses a “strong intimidation tone” so that schools view it as having the force of law. Tyler 
Kingkade, Republicans Push Education Department to Defend Its Handling of Sexual Assault Cases: 
Obama’s Pick to Lead the Department Can Expect to Spend the Next Year Justifying Its Treatment of 
Colleges, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2016, 7:30 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/education-secretary-title-ix_us_56cf45e8e4b0bf0dab31253d 
[https://perma.cc/BRT2-5J5F]. 
 163 See 2011 DCL, supra note 4, at 4–8, 10–16, 18–19. 
 164 See infra note 167. 
 165 See Gersen, supra note 133. 
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legislative rule regarding Title IX during the notice-and-comment process. 
That process has, unfortunately, become increasingly cumbersome,166 and 
critics of the DCL and the preponderance standard will almost definitely 
put up a fight during the comment period as well.167 Thus, this Part 
discusses the difficulty that OCR may encounter during the notice-and-
comment process before delving into reasons why future Title IX guidance 
regarding these issues should include the preponderance of the evidence 
standard as a requirement. 
A.   Challenges of the Notice-and-Comment Process 
When a potential rule goes through the notice-and-comment process, 
an agency is required to do three things: (1) issue a notice in the Federal 
Register, (2) allow the public to participate by sending the agency 
feedback, and (3) consider that feedback in creating the final rule.168 
Though this sounds like a simple process,169 Congress, the Executive 
Branch, and the courts have all contributed to making notice-and-comment 
rulemaking more and more burdensome over time.170 Due to heightened 
requirements, receiving feedback and ultimately promulgating a rule is not 
enough. Agencies like OCR must now provide extensive documentation of 
the sources relied upon when adopting a rule and must provide detailed 
explanations for why it adopted the final version of the rule.171 Agencies 
must also show that they took a “hard look” at significant objections and 
provide reasons for ruling out alternatives.172 Given these guidelines, if an 
agency promulgates a rule through notice and comment that is later 
 
 166 See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text. 
 167 For a sampling of critics, see Joseph Cohn, Campus Is a Poor Court for Students Facing 
Sexual-Misconduct Charges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 1, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/
Campus-Is-a-Poor -Court-for/134770 [https://perma.cc/MES8-DT2C]; Gersen, supra note 133; Nancy 
Gertner, Sex, Lies and Justice: Can We Reconcile the Belated Attention to Rape on Campus with Due 
Process?, AM. PROSPECT (2015), http://prospect.org/article/sex-lies-and-justice [https://perma.cc/F69E-
U37H]; Lukianoff, supra note 123 (naming and providing links to a slew of criticisms in the media). 
 168 See Franklin, supra note 74, at 282. 
 169 The APA itself names only those three simple requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 170 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 553 (2000) (presenting a chart of over 100 requirements that may be required for any 
given notice-and-comment process); see also supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing 
requirements added by courts, the Executive Branch, and Congress). 
 171 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATION 41–54 (1988); Seidenfeld, supra note 170, at 533. 
 172 See PIERCE, supra note 65, at 595 (“Indeed, in one major rulemaking, EPA wrote thousands of 
pages explaining how it resolved hundreds of issues based on its consideration of over one hundred 
studies and over one hundred thousand comments it received in response to its notice of proposed 
rulemaking.”); Franklin, supra note 74, at 283 (noting that this is a requirement that has been added by 
the courts). 
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challenged, the rule has the greatest chance of surviving if its initial 
assertion is well supported. 
Any administration that attempts to pass new regulations regarding 
Title IX campus sexual assault will have to decide whether to mandate a 
standard of proof for campus adjudications. The preponderance standard, 
which would very likely be challenged during notice and comment,173 is 
one provision of the DCL that should be preserved. The preponderance of 
the evidence standard creates the proper balance of procedural protections 
for each party involved in campus sexual assault adjudications. As such, it 
is exceedingly important that those in the educational and legal 
communities who support OCR’s push toward Title IX reform stand up for 
its importance just as ardently as the naysayers who call for its downfall. 
The agency should exercise its discretion to take steps toward attacking 
regulatory problems,174 and ensuring the legitimacy of the preponderance 
standard is a crucial next step for both the educational community and the 
legal community. 
B.   The Necessity of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard 
Though the preponderance standard is a procedural protection, it has 
concrete implications for victims of sexual assault, most of whom are 
women.175 Adopting the preponderance standard both aligns with the 
standards and practices of most educational institutions in addressing other 
campus civil rights violations and enhances the likelihood that Title IX can 
 
 173 A significant number of law professors and scholars and at least one independent organization 
have spoken out against the preponderance standard and would likely oppose it during the notice-and-
comment process. See, e.g., Berkowitz, supra note 13; Harvard University Professors, supra note 11; 
Penn Law Professors, supra note 11; Law Professors’ Open Letter Regarding Campus Free Speech and 
Sexual Assault, LANKFORD.SENATE.GOV (May 16, 2016), https://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Law-Professor-Open-Letter-May-16-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW7B-H73P]; see also Hendrix, 
supra note 13, at 615 (arguing that the clear and convincing standard of proof should govern campus 
sexual assault proceedings). 
 174 “[A]gencies have wide latitude to attack a regulatory problem in phases and . . . a phased-attack 
often has substantial benefits.” Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 471 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). 
 175 Surveys suggest that around 20% of women experience rape at some point in their lives, while 
the statistic is about 1% for men. See MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY 
REPORT 1 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3HPN-9J9M]. This survey does not even account for other forms of sexual assault. As 
such, the remainder of this section will largely refer to survivors of campus sexual assault using female 
pronouns and referents. 
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effectively combat sexual assault that “denies or limits a student’s ability to 
participate in or benefit from [a] school’s program.”176 
1.   Conceptual Framework 
In order to approach the question of evidentiary standards for campus 
sexual assault adjudications, it is important to clarify the conceptual 
standpoint of this Note. The arguments below are formulated around the 
baseline assumption that the accuser is at least somewhat likely to be 
telling the truth. Despite many stereotypes to the contrary,177 there is no 
proof that false rape or sexual assault allegations are more common than 
with any other kind of complaint.178 In fact, the FBI estimates that there is a 
very low likelihood of false reporting of rape, and existing studies support 
that conclusion.179 Starting with any assumption other than one that the 
report might be true automatically tips the scale away from the accuser and 
inherently disfavors her viewpoint. The procedural standards for campus 
adjudications should, therefore, be engineered to avoid making a value 
judgment that the accuser is not telling the truth. 
It is also important to clarify, before delving into the specifics, that 
campus proceedings are not the same as, or even akin to, criminal 
proceedings. When one student files a complaint that another sexually 
harassed or assaulted her, there are only a few possible end results. The 
most drastic possible outcome of a campus proceeding is that a student 
 
 176  OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Sex-Based Harassment, ED.GOV (2017), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/pro-students/issues/sex-issue01.html 
[https://perma.cc/7LBM-RP3L]. 
 177 For example, rape law traditionally required corroboration of rape accusations and cautionary 
instructions to juries because of the “societal notion that women have a tendency to lie about rape and 
sexual assault.” See Anderson, supra note 14, at 1948. Today, these sentiments persist in the criminal 
justice system and manifest in police officers who refuse to log sexual assault complaints or label them 
as such, choose not to investigate rape reports, and fail to test rape kits. See id.; Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2017). Gender 
stereotyping can also be accompanied by racial stereotyping, which has created a situation where 
women of color are less likely to report sexual assault than white women because they fear being 
disbelieved. See Deborah L. Brake, Fighting the Rape Culture Wars Through the Preponderance of the 
Evidence Standard, 78 MONT. L. REV. 109, 138 (2017). 
 178 See Brake, supra note 177, at 134. 
 179 A study conducted by the FBI found that only 8% of forcible rape complaints were verifiably 
false. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME INDEX OFFENSES REPORTED (1996), 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1996/96sec2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E74-8R7V]. A subsequent study 
placed the number between 2% and 10%. See David Lisak et al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault: 
An Analysis of Ten Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318 (2010). However, 
some suggest that this number might be skewed toward the high end because of the methodological 
assumption that recanting means that the original report was false, when in fact a number of pressures 
may lead a survivor to recant a true statement. See, e.g., Joanne Belknap, Rape: Too Hard to Report and 
Too Easy to Discredit Victims, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1335, 1363 (2010). Further, because of 
these statistical flaws, some suggest the exact statistic may be impossible to pin down. See, e.g., id. 
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adjudged to be responsible would be expelled from the institution.180 This 
result does not even remotely resemble those at play in a criminal trial: 
there is no potential criminal punishment or jail time or any mark on the 
accused’s criminal record. Because none of the relevant penological 
outcomes are attached to campus adjudications, even for accusations that 
might even rise to the level of a crime, neither should the criminal due 
process requirements attach.181 
2.   Adjudicative Proceedings on Campus 
Because sexual assault adjudications and criminal trials for sexual 
assault are starkly different, the two should not be conflated. Instead, when 
advocating for the continued use of the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, organizations and scholars helpfully compare campus 
adjudications for sexual assault violations with other forms of redress. For 
example, many have argued, as OCR does,182 that because civil rights 
violations tried in court require the preponderance standard of proof, a 
parallel standard should be required for Title IX adjudications because Title 
IX is a civil rights statute.183 Similarly, victims of sexual assault may 
choose to sue the perpetrator in court to claim civil damages, and those 
trials also require the application of the preponderance standard.184 
Furthermore, most other adjudications for violations of campus rules, such 
as academic dishonesty, require the use of a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.185 Thus, at the majority of schools, to treat sexual assault 
 
 180 See, e.g., NW. UNIV. STUDENT AFFAIRS, Disciplinary Sanctions for Individuals, STUDENT 
CONDUCT, http://www.northwestern.edu/student-conduct/student-code-of-conduct/sanctions/
disciplinary-sanctions-for-individuals/index.html [https://perma.cc/RD29-955Y] (listing expulsion, 
degree revocation, exclusion, suspension, disciplinary probation, university warning, fine, financial 
restitution, and restriction on access or contact). 
 181 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976) (acknowledging that formal procedural 
rules required in courts of law are not always appropriate for administrative agencies); Dixon v. Ala. 
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961) (setting the standard that most federal courts 
follow that student disciplinary proceedings do not need to have all of the procedural formalities of a 
criminal trial––they only need to ensure fair adversarial procedures); see also Brake, supra note 177, at 
137 (“The criminal law’s allocation of harm reflects the exceptionally high stakes of incarceration 
resulting from criminal proceedings. In civil cases, the [preponderance] standard reflects the 
equivalence of significant stakes on both sides.”). 
 182 See 2011 DCL, supra note 4, at 11. 
 183 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 14, at 1986; Letter from Know Your IX to Senators Lamar 
Alexander and Patty Murray (Feb. 25, 2016), http://knowyourix.org/wp-content/uploads/Letter-to-
HELP-Cmte-Re-Office-for-Civil-Rights.pdf; Letter from the Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. to Catherine 
Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Nov. 21, 2013), https://nwlc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/letter_to_ocr_re_sexual_harassment_and_violence.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RMC7-C89L]. 
 184 Anderson, supra note 14, at 1987. 
 185 Id. at 1985–86. The question of what standard should apply to campuses that utilize a higher 
standard of proof for all campus adjudications naturally arises. But the preponderance standard is proper 
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differently would be to afford those accused of campus sexual assault 
abuses special rights that no other student respondent in a campus 
proceeding enjoys, even though the punishments are parallel.186 
Despite these persuasive procedural arguments, opponents of the 
preponderance standard remain firmly entrenched in the idea that those 
accused of sexual assault on campus are at a severe procedural 
disadvantage.187 Many of these commentators believe that the clear and 
convincing standard of proof is more apt.188 However, clear and convincing 
is not definitively associated with a likelihood of guilt; it merely lies 
somewhere between a 51% and a 100% chance that the accused is 
responsible.189 The clear and convincing standard would create even more 
ambiguity in an adjudication marred by the stereotypes surrounding sexual 
assault complainants.190 In a situation where accusers are already likely to 
be distrusted, raising the bar on the “believability” of their claims by some 
immeasurable margin could be extremely harmful to the fairness of the 
process. 
Though it is considered less demanding, the preponderance of the 
evidence standard still requires more than a 50% likelihood that the 
accuser’s version of events is accurate—a fact that does not seem to 
dissuade those who claim that “he said-she said” scenarios will likely lead 
to more determinations in favor of accusers with this standard.191 
 
in all campus sexual assault proceedings, regardless of the standard used for other offenses. This is 
because of the unique circumstances and difficulties inherent in sexual assault adjudications, as 
discussed in this Section. A school’s individual rationale for applying a higher standard does not 
weaken the necessity for procedural balancing to aid sexual assault survivors. 
 186 See id. 
 187 See, e.g., Hendrix, supra note 13, at 615 (“[S]tudents accused of sexual assault in campus 
disciplinary proceedings are due a clear and convincing burden of proof because their interests far 
outweigh any costs imposed on the university by this additional protection . . . .”); Berkowitz, supra 
note 13 (“[U]niversities are institutionalizing a presumption of guilt in sexual assault cases.”); Law 
Professors’ Open Letter Regarding Campus Free Speech and Sexual Assault, supra note 173 (citing 
individuals who have spoken up about the due process implications of the Dear Colleague Letter). 
 188 See, e.g., Tamara Rice Lave, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication: Why Universities Should 
Reject the Dear Colleague Letter, 64 KAN. L. REV. 915, 957 (2016). 
 189 Clear and Convincing Evidence, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
clear_and_convincing_evidence [https://perma.cc/QP84-67ZN]. 
 190 For examples of these stereotypes, see Brake, supra note 177, at 134–35. 
 191 See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, What Should the Standard of Proof Be in Rape Cases? A New 
Lawsuit Takes Aim at the Department of Education’s Push to Force Colleges to Decide Cases Based on 
a “Preponderance of the Evidence,” ATLANTIC (June 17, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2016/06/campuses-sexual-misconduct/487505 [https://perma.cc/K2RQ-2FBA] (“Under the 
stronger standards, it’s possible to find against an accuser without implying or seeming to imply that he 
or she is a liar . . . . Whereas under a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard, an adjudicator who 
finds against an accuser is arguably saying that it’s more likely than not that he or she is lying (though it 
is technically possible that the evidence is split right down the middle). I suspect that will cause many 
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Commentators who criticize the use of the preponderance standard in 
campus sexual assault proceedings have also pointed to the typical use of 
the standard as one in which litigants are meant to “share the risk of error in 
roughly equal fashion.”192 But that may actually be some of the best support 
for upholding the preponderance standard: Title IX is intended to curtail the 
risk that a victim will have to live near, go to class with, continue to be 
harassed by, or generally have her education disrupted by a perpetrator of 
sexual assault.193 The risk that the survivor will continue to deal with 
emotional, and potentially life-altering, effects of her sexual assault are 
surely “roughly equal” to the risk of the accused losing some educational 
privileges if he or she is found responsible.194 
3.   Shortcomings of Campus Proceedings 
A conclusion about what process is due to the accused in campus 
sexual assault adjudications must be grounded in reality. To understand 
why the preponderance of the evidence standard is necessary to ensure that 
Title IX actually protects against sex discrimination in schools, and 
especially university settings, those who question the standard must keep 
the actual plight of victims in mind. Roadblocks at every step of the 
campus sexual assault reporting and adjudication processes make it 
unlikely that any form of punishment will result that may lend some relief 
to a victim. For example, victims of sexual assault underreport their 
encounters.195 One study found that less than 1% of victims of campus 
sexual assault initiated grievance proceedings against the perpetrator, 
despite almost one in five college women experiencing sexual assault 
during the period of her enrollment.196 Low reporting rates can be explained 
 
adjudicators to feel some pressure, if only self-imposed, to render verdicts that validate the claims of 
accusers––pressure that either endangers innocents or is a long overdue corrective to ‘rape culture,’ 
depending on your perspective.”). 
 192 See Hendrix, supra note 13, at 611 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)). 
 193 See UNITED EDUCATORS, supra note 24, at 3 (“Colleges [have] a duty to eliminate the harassing 
conduct and ensure the survivor/victim full participation in any education program or activity.”). 
 194 Additionally, those who are ultimately found responsible will not be subject to any kind of 
criminal sentencing, marks on their criminal record, or civil collateral consequences. See Anderson, 
supra note 14, at 1987. 
 195 See BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF 
COLLEGE WOMEN 23–24 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/182369.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U9UT-HLW4] (finding that 95.2% of completed rapes went unreported to police). 
 196 CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) 
STUDY 5-1, 5-27 (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5WHH-K3QF]. Additionally, 6.1% of men will experience the same. See id. Since the 
one-in-five statistic emerged in 2007, it has been widely challenged for methodological reasons—
including the challenges of measuring such a large population—but has continued to be substantiated 
by further studies. See, e.g., Charlene L. Muehlenhard et al., Evaluating the One-in-Five Statistic: 
Women’s Risk of Sexual Assault While in College, 54 J. SEX RES. 549 (2017) (finding that the statistic is 
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by a complex mix of societal pressures felt by the victim, including doubt 
about whether the incident constituted sexual assault,197 fear of retaliation 
by the perpetrator,198 and concerns that her account of the story will not be 
believed.199 The fact that survivors of rape are met with incredulity in the 
U.S. criminal justice system200 is unfortunately not entirely mitigated by the 
Title IX requirement that schools investigate each complaint. Schools often 
fail to follow up on complaints in a timely manner or investigate them 
fully, likely leading many victims to believe that reporting the incident is 
futile.201 
Campus sexual assault cases are also imperfect in that schools have a 
limited capacity to investigate claims and uncover corroborative 
evidence.202 As such, there is a strong likelihood that the victim would be 
unable to bolster her case enough to meet a heightened standard of proof. 
Proving that an allegation is substantially likely to be true under the clear 
and convincing standard would almost undoubtedly require more evidence 
than it would be possible for the victim to present.203 This means that 
victims have an even lower likelihood of successfully addressing the 
difficulties of going to school with or living near their abusers merely 
because they suffered a crime that often bears no witnesses. 
Even when the campus adjudicatory process finds a perpetrator 
responsible for his or her actions and issues some form of punishment, that 
punishment often fails to adequately mitigate the aftereffects of sexual 
assault for victims.204 Though critics of the preponderance standard 
generally contend that the punishments that the accused may face are too 
serious to permit such a low standard of proof, the punishments are not 
always as strict as one might expect. OCR does not regulate the punishment 
 
supported and the controversy surrounding it is based on misunderstandings about the studies’ methods 
and results, as well as their value implications). 
 197 See Amy Chmielewski, Defending the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in College 
Adjudications of Sexual Assault, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 159–60. 
 198 See id. at 159. 
 199 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 177, at 11. 
 200 For elaboration on this point, see id., at 20. 
 201 See Sarah Edwards, The Case in Favor of OCR’s Tougher Title IX Policies: Pushing Back 
Against the Pushback, 23 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 121, 127 (2015) (discussing how schools are not 
complying with mandated procedures, and citing as an example the 2014 OCR examination of Harvard 
Law School found the school had failed to conduct prompt investigations). 
 202 Tuerkheimer, supra note 177, at 5. 
 203 For an explanation of the standard, see Clear and Convincing Evidence, supra note 189. 
 204 A victim may still be forced to go to class with or interact with her assaulter on campus if the 
assaulter is not suspended, for example. See Chmielewski, supra note 197, at 166–67. 
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phase of campus adjudication at all.205 And, perhaps as a result of the lack 
of guidance, less than 30% of students found responsible for sexual assault 
are expelled, while about 50% are temporarily suspended—the remainder 
receive even less serious punishments.206 Even when students are 
suspended, their punishments are regularly delayed until after they have 
completed graduation requirements, and sometimes the perpetrator is even 
given permission to return to campus.207 This allows abusers to haunt their 
victims’ educational experience by interrupting their ability to attend class 
and lead a normal life. 
All in all, inadequate fact-finding procedures and punishments 
exacerbate the underreporting problem, allowing the specter of sexual 
assault to loom large over U.S. schools. These macrolevel institutional 
failings discourage reporting and send a message to victims that their 
experiences are not worthy of remediation.208 They also allow campus 
sexual assault to be swept under the rug and further add to a culture of tacit 
acceptance of sexist acts that Title IX should actively combat. 
4.   Why Campus Sexual Assault Adjudications Are Necessary 
Campus adjudications are far from perfect forums for adjudicating 
claims. With all the system’s flaws, some question whether these claims are 
better left to the criminal justice system alone. While it is true that campus 
adjudications do not implement criminal law, they are still necessary.209 
This is so for two reasons: (1) campus complaints can operate through 
 
 205 See Tyler Kingkade, Sexual Assault Victims Complain About Loopholes in Their Attackers’ 
Suspensions, HUFFINGTON POST (published May 8, 2015, 8:09 PM; updated May 17, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/08/sexual-assault-suspensions_n_7228198.html 
[https://perma.cc/HJ6P-24ZD]. 
 206 See Tyler Kingkade, Fewer Than One-Third of Campus Sexual Assault Cases Result in 
Expulsion, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2014, 8:59 AM; updated Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/29/campus-sexual-assault_n_5888742.html 
[https://perma.cc/8JYH-MWCV] (citing data gathered through Freedom of Information Act requests 
regarding the adjudications at more than 125 schools during the 2011-13 fiscal years); see also Caleb 
Diehl, 500-Word Essay Assigned as Punishment for Sexual Assault at Gustavus College, USA TODAY 
COLL. (Mar. 11, 2016, 1:02 PM), http://college.usatoday.com/2016/03/11/500-word-essay-assigned-as-
punishment-for-sexual-assault-at-gustavus-college [https://perma.cc/ZX8F-QBCN] (noting that one 
student was only required to write a 500-word essay). 
 207 See Kingkade, supra note 205 (discussing investigations of student punishments at Michigan 
State University, University of California at San Francisco, and University of Nevada at Las Vegas). 
 208 See Brake, supra note 177, at 119 (“The stories of survivors contain abundant accounts of 
institutional insensitivity, blunders, and cover-ups protecting accused students . . . and showcase a 
major reason why campus sexual assault is underreported: the fear that institutions will side with the 
accused student and that nothing will be done.”). 
 209 That is not to say that the criminal justice system does not need to be concerned with sexual 
assaults that occur on campuses. Indeed, criminal charges should be brought in many campus sexual 
assault cases. 
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student honor codes, which may contain different standards than those for 
criminal sexual assault; and (2) the protections that educational institutions 
can offer are far different than the brand of justice offered by criminal 
courts. 
Universities have their own codes of ethics, which demarcate honor 
code violations and grounds for academic punishments.210 For sexual 
assault, most institutions can make independent determinations about what 
sexual consent is required, and many institutions have decided to raise the 
bar above state and federal law to require affirmative consent.211 This 
means that a sexual assault complaint that may not be prosecuted in 
criminal court could still proceed to campus adjudication. Through the 
campus processes, victims may, therefore, have unique rights to 
adjudication of claims that would otherwise be overlooked. In this way, 
campus proceedings can sometimes allow for more expansive definitions of 
sexual assault or rape that may help remedy the overall problem on 
campuses. 
In addition to the potential for new claims, Title IX campus 
adjudications create protections for victims that the criminal justice system 
cannot. Campus adjudications can result in special living or class 
accommodations for the victim, aimed at minimizing any chance that the 
abuser will interrupt her education.212 Criminal prosecutions, while ensuring 
a brand of justice that is unavailable in campus proceedings, are rarely 
undertaken,213 are often extremely lengthy and arduous, and may fail to 
remove the abuser from the presence of the victim.214 Thus, in order for a 
sexual assault victim’s education to continue with the least amount of 
disturbance, campus adjudications (though far from ideal) are necessary. 
 
 210 Recently, some of these requirements have been determined by state law. See, e.g., Jeanne 
Zaino, Changing Definitions of Sexual Consent on College Campuses, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 21, 
2015, 8:42 PM), https://www.insidehighered.com/blogs/university-venus/changing-definitions-sexual-
consent-college-campuses [https://perma.cc/H7A8-ESQ2] (discussing the recent shift beginning with 
New York and California laws regarding the sexual consent standard on campuses). 
 211 See id. 
 212 Available remedies can include no-contact orders, adjusting class or activity schedules, 
changing on-campus housing, providing academic support that might include makeup test dates, and 
offering counseling services. See University Student, Faculty, and Staff Title IX Rights, HOPKINSWAY, 
PLLC (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.hopkinsway.com/university-student-faculty-staff-title-ix-rights 
[https://perma.cc/2N4Y-7KHZ]. 
 213 See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAINN (2016), 
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/S45P-CDLG] (indicating that 
only 11 out of every 310 reported rapes get referred to prosecutors). 
 214 The offender will only be removed if he is jailed, but only 6 out of every 310 reported rapes 
lead to the perpetrator’s incarceration. See id. 
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Despite the utility of campus proceedings, the odds are still stacked 
against a victim who speaks out against her assaulter. Obstacles include the 
fact that incorrect societal presumptions exist about women falsely 
reporting sexual assault, that very little evidence is available prior to the 
proceedings, and that the remedies are often inadequate. These factors 
converge to create an extremely low likelihood that victims can 
successfully adjudicate their complaints and receive sufficient relief. The 
preponderance standard tackles this imbalance because it necessarily tips 
the scales of procedural equality back toward equilibrium between the two 
parties. 
CONCLUSION 
In an effort to improve campus sexual assault adjudications, the 
Obama Administration’s OCR went too far by enforcing the DCL. Though 
it was promulgated nonlegislatively, the DCL was improperly given the 
force of law. OCR may have done so to improve campus adjudications of 
sexual assault, but the DCL was invalid because it did not undergo notice-
and-comment procedures. 
Hope for campus sexual assault reform lies with the notice-and-
comment process which, though daunting, creates the opportunity for Title 
IX enforcement backed by law. When OCR opens the door for comments 
on its legislative rulemaking, those in favor of campus sexual assault 
reform have the responsibility to support the invaluable provisions once 
contained in the DCL. The preponderance of the evidence standard should 
outlast the notice-and-comment process because of its unique capability to 
ensure adjudications that protect the rights of campus sexual assault 
victims. The educational opportunities of sexual assault victims should no 
longer be sidelined under the guise of necessary additional protections for 
the accused. Sexual assault survivors deserve a legitimate shot at proving 
their claims and receiving a remedy that will allow them to continue their 
education. The preponderance standard can provide that. Title IX is only 
helpful to the extent that it actually performs an equalizing function in 
education, and the preponderance standard is indispensable in effectuating 
that goal. 
